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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Thomas Moffat asserts that the district court erred in allowing the prosecution for
attempted strangulation to proceed after he had pled guilty to domestic battery based on
the same course of conduct in a different proceeding.

The second, independent

prosecution for attempted strangulation placed him in double jeopardy in violation of
both his state and federal constitutional rights.
Because there was no bilateral uniqueness to the elements of the statutes under
which he was separately prosecuted, the second prosecution violated Mr. Moffat's
constitutional rights.

In addition, the charging documents failed to charge separate

crimes based on separate courses of conduct, which also violated the Idaho
constitution's protections in addition to the violation evidenced by the lack of bilateral
uniqueness.

Rather, the attempted strangulation charge was merely a means or

manner by which the domestic battery charge occurred in the same course of conduct.
Due to these violations of his state and federal constitutional protections against
double jeopardy, this Court should overturn the district court's order denying his motion
to dismiss and vacate Mr. Moffat's conviction for attempted strangulation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On May 9, 2010, Mr. Moffat was engaged in a domestic dispute with Jennifer
Nelson. (R., p.6.) The couple had been dating for approximately a year and had been
living together for approximately six months. (R., p.6.) At one point during the dispute,
Mr. Moffat grabbed Ms. Nelson's hair and neck and threw her around the room.
(R., p.6.)

His conduct left marks and scrapes on her neck, back, and knees, all of

1

which were still visible to responding officers nearly eight hours later.1

Officer Paul

Tolman was one of the officers who responded to the incident, and eventually, he
placed Mr. Moffat under arrest for domestic battery pursuant to I.C. § "18-918(b)(3)
[sic].,,2 (R., pp.8-9; R., p.71 (copy of the citation issued).) Officer Tolman testified that
the initial citation was for Mr. Moffat's course of conduct on May 9, 2010, which included
the actions which caused the injuries about Ms. Nelson's neck.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.24,

L.22 - p.25, L.2l
In a follow-up interview held on May 10, 2010, Ms. Nelson informed Officer
Tolman that some nights before, Mr. Moffat had threatened both himself and
Ms. Nelson with his gun. (R., p.9; Tr., Vol. 1, p.27, Ls.1-18.) Officer Tolman testified that
the reports generated from that interview were forwarded to the Bannock County
Prosecutor for a determination if an aggravated assault charge (and not an attempted
strangulation charge) might be worth pursuing because "that's all we had."

(See

Tr., Vol. 1, p.27, Ls.19-23.)
Ms. Nelson amended her statement again on May 14, 2010, modifying it to
indicate that while Mr. Moffat had his hand about her neck, she had trouble breathing.
(R., pp.14, 75.)

Her amended statement did not indicate that Mr. Moffat made any

1 Ms. Nelson reported that the dispute had occurred around 5:00 a.m. on May 9,
2010. (R., p.6.) Officer Paul Tolman was not dispatched to the scene until 12:45 p.m.
(R., p.6.)
2 The officer apparently reversed the number and letter of the code cite subsections,
which is properly "I.c. § 18-918(3)(b)."
3 There are two separately bound and paginated volumes of transcripts in this case.
To promote clarity, the volume containing the hearing on Mr. Moffat's motion to dismiss,
held on March 10, 2011, will be referred to as "Tr., VoI.1." The other volume, containing
the change of plea and sentencing hearings, held on May 2, 2011, and June 27, 2011,
respectively, will be referred to as "Tr., VoI.2."
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additional actions, but only that the choking had occurred during his course of conduct
on May 9, 2010. (See R, pp.14, 75.)
Mr. Moffat was promptly and initially prosecuted for his conduct on May 9,
2010, by the City of Pocatello for domestic battery pursuant to I.C. § 18-918(3)(b).
(R., pp.78-79 (State's Exhibit C - Record of Actions for the misdemeanor case); R p.71
(the misdemeanor citation); R, p.90 (the district court's recitation of the facts in its
Minute Entry and Order on the Motion to Dismiss).) Then, more than two months after
receiving the information and reports from police, the Bannock County prosecutor filed a
new, separate charge on July 23, 2010, for attempted strangulation in violation of
I.C. § 18-923(1) based on the May 9,2010, course of conduct. (R, pp.1.) Mr. Moffat
pled guilty to the domestic battery charge on October 12, 2010, and was sentenced
accordingly on November 16, 2010. (R, p.79 (State's Exhibit C - Record of Actions
for the misdemeanor case); R, p.90.)

He was bound over to district court for

attempted strangulation on October 25, 2010. (R, pp.34, 90.) The county prosecutor
subsequently filed a Prosecuting Attorney's Information on October 28, 2010, alleging a
violation of I.C. § 18-923(1) based on the May 9, 2010, course of conduct. (R., p.36.)
Mr. Moffat was arraigned on the attempted strangulation charge in district court on
November 1, 2010. 4 (R, pp.38-39.)
Mr. Moffat moved to dismiss the attempted strangulation charge after he had
pled guilty to the domestic battery charge because the attempted strangulation
prosecution violated both his state and federal constitutional protections against double
4 The timeline of these events is critical, and so, to promote clarity, Mr. Moffat
summarizes the timeline as follows: (1) filing of charges for domestic battery, (2) filing
of complaint for attempted strangulation, (3) entry of guilty plea to domestic battery,
(4) binding over for attempted strangulation, (5) filing of information for attempted
strangulation, and (6) sentencing for domestic battery.
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jeopardy.

(R., pp.51-55.)

The district court denied his motion.

(R., p.99.)

It broke

its rational into three parts based on the Idaho Court of Appeals' discussion in
State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368 (Ct. App. 2011), which examined Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), and the application of Blockburger under the Idaho
constitution.
In regard to the statutory theory, 5 the district court claimed that there was the
requisite bilateral uniqueness in the statutes. (R., p.94.) It asserted that the attempted
strangulation statute required a unique element of proof because it specifically defined
the touching (i.e., choke or attempt to strangle), while the battery statute only required a
general showing of forceful or unwelcome touching. (R., p.94.) However, in regard to
this perceived distinction, the district court subsequently admitted that, in order to
commit attempted strangulation, Mr. Moffat "would have to commit a battery.,,6
(R., p.99 (emphasis added).) The district court also claimed that the domestic battery
statute required proof of a unique element based on the distinction that the battery
statute required the victim to be a household member while the attempted strangulation
statute allowed for a showing that the victim was either a household member or in a
dating relationship with the offender.

(R., p.94.)

The district court also applied this

reasoning to the hybrid theory, which it labeled the "Elements Theory,,,7 holding that

Analysis of whether there is only one offense charged by reviewing the statutes under
which the defendant has been charged looking for bilateral uniqueness in the elements
thereof. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
6 The county prosecutor also admitted that absent only the intent to choke, Mr. Moffat's
actions would constitute a domestic battery (battery against a household member).
(See Tr., Vol. 1, p.36, Ls.2-17.)
7 The hybrid theory has not been formally recognized, but consists of the application of
aspects from both the pleading theory and the statutory theory to determine whether
two charges are for a single offense. See, e.g., State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 374
(Ct. App. 2011); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211 (1986).
5

4

because attempted strangulation focuses on the act of choking or strangling (and not
specifically "a battery"), the attempted strangulation statute does not incorporate the
elements of the domestic battery statute (which does require commission of a battery).
(R., pp.97-99.)
The district court also found that, under the pleading theory,8 Mr. Moffat's
assertion that he pled guilty based only on his grabbing at the victim's neck was
disproved by Officer Tolman's report and testimony that there were other injuries
involved and that the basis for the attempted strangulation charge was not reported until
Ms. Nelson amended her initial statement on May 14, 2010. (R., p.96.) Officer Tolman
had testified that, as to the initial investigation and charge:
A [Officer Tolman]. She had scrape marks on her nose. I believe she had
scrape marks on her back, and she did have some finger-type marks on
her neck that I could distinguish. 9
Q [by prosecutor]. And when you went about completing the investigation,
you issued a citation?

A. I did, for Domestic Battery ....
Q. You said that you had not determined that there had been any felony
committed?

A. At that time, no. I didn't see any felony.
(Tr., Vo/'1, p.24, L.22 - p.25, L.2.)

He continued, in regard to the subsequent

statements made by Ms. Nelson:

8 The pleading theory requires analysis of whether there is only one offense charged by
reviewing the statutes under which the defendant has been charged looking at the
pleading documents to see if one crime was alleged as a means to commit or element
of another crime. State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430,434 (1980).
9 In his report, Officer Tolman had described these marks as "injuries to the left side of
her neck. She had several red scrape marks consistent with finger marks." (R., p.5.)
He also stated that they were "distinct red marks on her neck which still appeared to be
fresh and had fresh scraped skin." (R., p.6.)
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Q [by prosecutor]. But at a later time date in time, did you make a
determination there had been a possible felony?

A [Officer Tolman]. I did. The following day1° after [Ms. Nelson] had gone
to court, she came back in and was upset that we hadn't mentioned
anything about the report of Mr. Moffat holding a gun to her head, and I
went back and reviewed the notes that Sergeant Higby and I had taken
and a tape-recorded interview that we had conducted and found that I had
missed that when she said it. She said it very briefly,11 and it kind of came
back to -- she came back to ask why we didn't bring it up, so we brought
her back in and did an interview again, tape-recorded, and she gave us a
little more information ... and then we forwarded that to the Prosecuting
Attorney to make the determination on felony charges.
Q. And you said "felony charges" was just ag [sic] assault that she --

A. We were just looking for Aggravated Assault at that point; that's all we
had.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.26, L.26 - p.27, L.23.)

Officer Tolman also indicated that there was a

subsequent interview with Ms. Nelson, but that he had not participated in that interview.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.27, L.24 - p.28, L.3.)

The report from that subsequent interview on

May 12, 2010, indicated that Ms. Nelson clarified her initial statement, stating that while
Mr. Moffat had his hand about her neck, he caused her to be unable to breathe, and
tossed her to the floor. (R., p.14.) She did not mention any new action by Mr. Moffat
during the course of conduct on May 9,2010. (See generally R, pp.14-16.)
After his motion to dismiss was denied, Mr. Moffat agreed to a conditional,
binding plea agreement. (R, pp.117 -119.) Per the agreement, Mr. Moffat would plead
guilty to attempted strangulation, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his

10 Based on the fact that Officer Tolman indicated that a subsequent interview took
place with other officers, and the only other such interview indicated in the records was
held on May 12, 2010, "the following day" must be May 10, 2010. (See R, p.78.) This
is consistent with his statement that this interview took place after Ms. Nelson had gone
to court, and Mr. Moffat's arraignment on the misdemeanor domestic battery charge
was held on May 10, 2010. (R., p.78.)

6

motion to dismiss, and he could withdraw his guilty plea if he won that challenge.
(R., p.117.) The State agreed that the binding agreement would require a sentence of
probation, but that the duration of the underlying sentence and length of probation
would be left to the district court. (R., p.118.) It also agreed to recommend a withheld
judgment, although that recommendation would not be binding on the district court.
(R., p.118.)
R., p.119.)

The district court agreed to be bound by those terms.
It did not, however, grant the withheld judgment.

(See, e.g.,

(Tr., pAO, Ls.18-2S.)

Accordingly, it imposed a unified sentence of eleven years, with five years fixed, and
suspended that sentence for a period of five years. (R., p.122.)
Mr. Moffat exercised his right under the conditional agreement and filed a timely
notice of appeal challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss. (R., pp.130-133.)

The summary of those notes included in the report forwarded to the prosecutor
indicate that the event with the gun was a significant point of conversation during that
interview. (R., pp.1S, 76-77.)
11

7

ISSUE
Whether the district court improperly denied Mr. Moffat's motion to dismiss because the
second prosecution violated his state and federal constitutional rights to be free from
double jeopardy.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Improperly Denied Mr. Moffat's Motion To Dismiss Because The
Second Prosecution Violated His State And Federal Constitutional Rights To Be Free
From Double Jeopardy
A.

Introduction
Both the state and federal constitutions provide protection from double jeopardy.

Both those protections are violated when the State subjects the defendant to separate
prosecutions or separate punishments under two statutes which are not bilaterally
unique from one another, meaning that each statute must have an element unique from
the other statute.

Where one statute does not have a unique element from another

statute, it is considered to be an included offense, and thus, separate prosecution or
separate punishment under those statutes is a violation of the protections against
double jeopardy.

A violation of the state constitution's protections may also be

demonstrated by showing that both charges arise out of the same course of conduct
and one charge is merely the means or manner by which the other is committed.
In this case, domestic battery and attempted strangulation are included offenses
to one another. As Mr. Moffat had already been charged and pled guilty to domestic
battery, the second, independent prosecution and second punishment for attempted
strangulation violated his constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy. As such,
the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss for that reason was improper. This
Court should overturn that decision and dismiss the attempted strangulation case.

B.

Engaging In The Second Prosecution Or Alternatively, Imposing The Second
Punishment In The Attempted Assault Case Violated Mr. Moffat's Constitutional
Rights To Be Free From Double Jeopardy
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment's Double

Jeopardy Clause to mean that "two valid sentences for the same conviction cannot

9

coexist." Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 267 (1943). Article I, Section 13 of
the Idaho Constitution is coextensive with the federal provision. State v. McKeeth, 136
Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001).

These protections can be violated in three ways:

(1) engaging in a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal has been
entered; (2) engaging in a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction
has been entered; or (3) imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. United
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 622. In this
case, Mr. Moffat's rights were violated pursuant to both the second and third
alternatives. The State engaged in a second prosecution for the same offense after a
conviction. 12 The State also imposed multiple convictions for the same offense. Under
either provision, Mr. Moffat's constitutional rights were violated. See Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161, 166 (1977); State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525,527,530-31 (2011).
There are two tests in Idaho to determine whether the prosecution of multiple
charges is actually multiple prosecutions for the same offense. See, e.g., Flegel, 151
Idaho at 527, 530-31. The first is the same as the federal courts apply to the federal
constitution: the statutory theory established in Blockburger. Id. at 527. The second is
the broader pleading theory, established in Idaho in Thompson, supra.
Idaho at 374; see Flegel, 151 Idaho at 229.

Corbus, 151

Subsequent interpretations of the

Thompson rule have, however, hybridized the two tests, applying elements of both
when determining whether only one offense exists.

See Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374

(examining Sivak, supra, State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742 (1991), overruled on other

12 Entry of a guilty plea constitutes a "conviction." United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho
403, 404 (2008).
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grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,433 (1991), and State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho
383 (2010)).
The result of the hybridization is that if a prosecution fails under either test, the
second prosecution is constitutionally invalid and the second conviction should be
vacated. See Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527, 530-31 (examining "whether a violation of [a
statute] was an included offense of the indictment charging a violation of [another
statute] under either the statutory or pleading theory") (emphasis added); see also
Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374-75 (detailing the precedent applying both tests to alleged
violations of the Idaho constitution).

1.

Under The Blockburger Statutory Theory,13 The Second Prosecution For
Attempted Strangulation Is Constitutionally Invalid Under Both The State
And Federal Constitutions, As The Requisite Bilateral Uniqueness Does
Not Exist Between The Domestic Battery And Attempted Strangulation
Statutes

The United States Supreme Court held that, to determine whether multiple
prosecutions violated the federal Constitution's protection against double jeopardy,
courts are to look to the elements of the statutes under which the defendant had been
charged.

See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.

Where the statutes were bilaterally

unique, in that "each provision requires proof of a fact [element] which the other does
not," there were two offenses and there was no double jeopardy violation in pursuing
multiple prosecutions. Id.
The two statutes at issue in this case are I.C. § 18-923(1) (attempted
strangulation) and I.C. § 18-918(3)(b) (misdemeanor domestic battery).

(See, e.g.,

13 Since the hybridization theory discussed in Corbus, 151 Idaho 374-75, returns to an
analysis of the elements of the statute, that theory is necessarily discussed
simultaneously with the statutory theory.
11

R., pp.1, 71; see also R., pp.36, 78.) The elements for attempted strangulation are that

the defendant (1) willfully and unlawfully (2) choked or attempted to strangle
(3) a household member.

I.C. § 18-923(1); see also I.C.J.I. 1214. The elements for

misdemeanor domestic battery are that the defendant (1) committed a battery
(2) against a household member.

I.C. § 18-918(3)(b); see also I.C.J.I. 1204.

The

elements for a battery are that the defendant (1) willfully and unlawfully (2a) used
force of violence upon the victim, or (2b) touched or struck the victim against his or her
will, or (2c) caused bodily harm to the victim.14 I.C. § 18-903; see also I.C.J.I. 1204.
Both statutes require willful and unlawful action against a household member.15
Compare I.C. § 18-923(1) with I.C. § 18-918(3)(b) and I.C. § 18-903. The only other

element required in either statute is that the defendant touches the victim. Id.
The district court erroneously forced a distinction between the statutes,
specifically trying to justify a distinction between general touching or use of force and
touching or use of force with intent to strangle. (See R., p.94.) The Blockburger test is

14 There are three alternative means by which a person may commit a battery and each
uses its own phrasing of the mens rea requirement (i.e., "willfully and unlawfully" as
opposed to "actually, intentionally, and unlawfully"). See I.C. § 18-903; see also I.C.J.I.
1204. These variations, as well as the alternatives in regard to the actus reus, are not
substantively different, leaving "a battery" summarized as "the willful and unlawful
touching of another person." See id.
15 As will be discussed in depth on page 15, infra, the term "household member" in the
domestic battery statute (I.C. § 18-918) has been interpreted to include all "intimate
relationships." Therefore, the fact that the attempted strangulation statute (I.C. § 18923) has the additional option of "dating relationship" is irrelevant because that would
constitute an intimate relationship, especially since, in this case, the couple was
cohabitating. As such, both statutes require proof of the element that the victim and
defendant were in an intimate relationship. Regardless, included offenses need not be
coextensive; one may require proof of additional elements without voiding the
constitutional protections against double jeopardy. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 164;
State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114 (1979). However, where only one statute
requires proof of additional elements, there is not the requisite bilateral uniqueness
necessary to allow the dual prosecutions. See, e.g., Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
12

not so specific; rather, the question is whether each statutory provision requires proof of
a fact [element] not required by the other statute. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 180. The
United States Supreme Court has clarified that, "[i]t has long been understood that
separate statutory crimes need not be identical either in constituent elements or in
actual proof in order to be the same within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition."
Brown, 432 U.S. at 164. Both of the statutes in question require proof of a forceful or

otherwise unwelcome touching.

See I.C. § 18-923(1); I.C. § 18-918(3)(b). The only

difference is the specificity required to prove that fact: touching, as opposed to touching
with the intent to choke or strangle. Id. However, as the Brown Court pointed out, such
variation in required proof does not void the constitutional protection. Brown, 432 U.S.
at 164. Both statutes require proof of the fact that the defendant touched the victim in a
forceful, unwelcome, or unlawful manner. See I.C. § 18-923(1); I.C. § 18-918(3)(b) (and
I.C. § 18-903 included by reference therein). Since both statutes require proof of the
same elements, there is no bilateral uniqueness. See, e.g., Blockburger, 284 U.S. at
304; Brown, 432 U.S. at 164. Therefore, charges under the two statutes may not be

separately prosecuted because they are included charges. Id.; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 208;
Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392.

The prosecutor admitted as much (that domestic battery is an included offense to
attempted strangulation) during the hearing on Mr. Moffat's motion to dismiss:
THE COURT:
[L]et's assume for purposes of this argument
that. . . he grabbed her neck, but the evidence doesn't show that he
actually attempted to strangle or choke her, just grabbed her by the neck,
then would that necessarily be a Domestic Battery?
[PROSECUTOR]: That could be a misdemeanor Domestic Battery .
. . . [B]ut to have an attempt[ed] strangulation, you have to have intent to
choke or strangle.

13

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.36, Ls.2-10, 16-17 (implying that the only difference between domestic
battery and attempted strangulation is whether the defendant committed the battery with
the intent to choke or strangle).)

Where the only difference is the need to prove a

particular intent, the crimes are considered included offenses.
at 167. 16

See Brown, 432 U.S.

The district court also admitted that bilateral uniqueness does not exist

between these two statutes, although its admission was far more explicit: "While it is
true that a defendant would have to commit a battery in order to complete the

crime of attempted strangulation, the attempted strangulation statute does not
contemplate or require as an element of the offense that the defendant commit a
battery.,,17

(R., p.99 (emphasis added).)

This logic is a perfect demonstration of

unilateral uniqueness: all attempted strangulations are batteries, but not all batteries

16 Brown dealt with the question of whether joyriding and auto theft were included
offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. Brown, 432 U.S. at 167. To that end, the
United States Supreme Court found:
Joyriding consists of taking or operating a vehicle without the owner's
consent, and auto theft consists of joyriding with the intent permanently to
deprive the owner of possession. Joyriding is the lesser included offense.
The prosecutor who has established joyriding need only prove the
requisite intent in order to establish auto theft.
Id. (emphasis added). Based on the State's admission (through its representative, the
county prosecutor), Mr. Moffat's actions constituted at least a domestic battery, and all
that the prosecutor needed to show to prove an attempted strangulation was the
requisite intent. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. p.36, Ls.2-10, 16-17.) Therefore, just as in Brown,
domestic battery is an included offense to attempted strangulation and the subsequent
prosecution violated Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional rights to be free from
double jeopardy. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 167-68; see also Sivak, 112 Idaho at 208;
Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392.
17 The only other element to reach domestic battery from traditional battery is that the
battery be committed against a household member. I.C. § 19-918(3)(b). Attempted
strangulation also requires proof of commission against a household member.
I.C. § 18-923(1). As such, domestic battery does not require proof of an element that
attempted strangulation does not, and without the necessary bilateral uniqueness, the
second prosecution violates the constitutional protections. See, e.g., Blockburger, 284
U.S. at 304; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 208; Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392.
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are attempted strangulations. 18

Since the district court and the prosecutor both

acknowledged that an attempted strangulation must constitute a battery, the only
possible point of uniqueness between the statutes revolves around who must be the
victim of the touching.
The district court pointed out that the domestic battery statute required the State
to prove the act had been committed against a household member, but that attempted
strangulation could be committed against a household member or a person with whom
the defendant was in a dating relationship. (R., p.94.) However, the Idaho Supreme
Court has determined in regard to the term "household member" in the domestic battery
statute:
all examples of 'household member' preceding the ambiguous phrase"spouse, former spouse, or a person who has a child in common
regardless of whether they have been married"-denote marital or
intimate relationship. I.C. § 18-918(1 )(a). In addition, the phrase at issue
["a person with whom a person is cohabiting"] is followed by the qualifying
phrase "whether or not they have married or have held themselves out to
be husband or wife." Id. ... [T]he definition of "household member" plainly
does not apply in the absence of an intimate relationship . ...

State v. Schultz, 151 Idaho 863, 867 (2011) (emphasis added). Therefore, as the term
"household members" in the domestic battery statute encompasses all those persons in
intimate relationships, that term must include persons in a dating relationship.
Regardless, the two potential points of uniqueness are both in the attempted
strangulation statute (it has the more specific touching requirement and it has the
additional potential victim).

That does not, however, make the statutes bilaterally

unique. As has long been the case with included offenses:
An offense will be deemed to be a lesser included offense of another,
greater offense, if all the elements required to sustain a conviction of the
18 Bilateral uniqueness requires the conclusion that not all attempted strangulations are
batteries and not all batteries are attempted strangulations.
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lesser included offense are included within the elements needed to sustain
a conviction of the greater offense. Of course, the greater offense may
require proof of additional elements in order to sustain a conviction. Or, if
in committing an offense one necessarily commits a second offense, that
second offense will be deemed a lesser included offense.
McCormick, 100 Idaho at 114 (emphasis added). Since there is no element unique to

the domestic battery statute (i.e., all the elements required to sustain a conviction for
domestic battery are included within the elements needed to sustain a conviction for
attempted strangulation, see McCormick, 100 Idaho at 114),19 dual prosecution under
these two statutes fails the Blockburger test.

See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304;

McCormick, 100 Idaho at 114; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 208; Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392.

Because I.C. § 18-918(3)(b) does not require proof of any unique element from
I.C. § 18-923(1), there is no bilateral uniqueness between the statutes and domestic
battery is an included offense for attempted strangulation. Thus, the dual prosecutions
and sentences violated Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional rights to be free
from double jeopardy. See, e.g., Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; Flegel, 151 Idaho at
530-31; Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392.

2.

Under The Thompson Pleading Theory, The Second Prosecution For
Attempted Strangulation Is Invalid Under The Idaho Constitution, As The
Attempted Strangulation Was Merely The Means Or Manner By Which
The Domestic Battery Was Committed

As to the pleading theory, the district court misapplied the test.

When

establishing the test in Thompson, the Idaho Supreme Court made it clear that where
there is only one course of conduct, a second prosecution was constitutionally

19 The State must prove that the defendant intentionally and unlawfully touched a
household member. Aggravated Strangulation incorporates all those elements, only
adding the additional requirements that the touching be done with the intent to choke or
strangle, and that the intimate relationship necessary for the "household member"
requirement include a dating relationship.
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impermissible.

See, e.g., Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435 ("There is no separate event

upon which to base the additional charge.") Instead, in situations where there is but one
event, the second charge may simply be the means or manner by which the first charge
might be committed. Id. For example, the Thompson Court examined Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980), in which assault with a deadly weapon was but the means
by which the defendant attempted to commit robbery.20 Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435.
Without a second course of conduct, there could be no second offense. Id.
Idaho courts consistently applied this rule to subsequent cases. See, e.g., Sivak,
112 Idaho at 211-12 (holding that where robbery was the prerequisite felony for a felony
murder charge, it was the manner or means by which the felony murder was committed.
Therefore, as charged, robbery was an included offense of felony murder, and as such,

a separate conviction for robbery was constitutionally impermissible); compare Pizzuto,
119 Idaho at 757 (holding that, because first-degree murder as charged required proof
of specific intent to kill the victim (see I.C. § 18-4001), robbery was not the means or
manner of that offense (like it was with a felony murder charge, where the killing was
not a premeditated result of the robbery (see I.C. § 18-4003(d)).

Rather, the killing

constituted its own separate and distinct course of actions, which included the
premeditation. Therefore, robbery, as charged, was not an included offense for firstdegree murder and the dual convictions are constitutionally permissible).21

20 The Thompson Court provided a clear example of the contrasting situation in its
examination of McCormick, 100 Idaho 111. In McCormick, dual convictions were
permissible for rape and burglary because the burglary was complete once the
defendant entered the victim's house, which was the first course of conduct. The
defendant then engaged in a new, second course of conduct (the acts of intercourse),
which was the basis for the rape. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435.
21 It is interesting to note that in applying the Thompson pleading theory, the courts still
look to the statutory elements underlying the charges. See Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374.
As such, while the proper test for double jeopardy under the Idaho constitution may not
17

In this case, it is clear that there was only one course of conduct underlying both
charges - the incident on May 9, 2010. (See R., p.1 (charge for attempted strangulation
explicitly based on the events of May 9, 2010); R., p.71 (citation issued for domestic
battery on May 9, 2010), Tr., Vol. 1, p.23, L.11 - p.25, L.9 (Officer Tolman's testimony
that he issued the domestic battery charge based on all the injuries resulting from
Mr. Moffat's course of conduct on May 9, 2010).) There is no separate event upon
which the attempted strangulation could be based, and so the second prosecution and
second punishment for that charge violated Mr. Moffat's state constitutional right to be
free from double jeopardy. See, e.g., Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at
211-12.
The district court focused too narrowly on the facts and forced an improper
separation into Mr. Moffat's course of conduct.

(See R., p.97.)

The United States

Supreme Court has clearly held that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile
guarantee that prosecutors [or judges] can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient
of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units." Brown, 432 U.S. at
169. Yet the district court explicitly said that was what it was doing:
The Defendant, in fact, committed the separate and distinct crime of
domestic battery when he grabbed the victim by the hair and threw her
around the room, which resulted in abrasions to her back and knees .... 22
be fully clear, a violation under either the statutory or pleading theory likely constitutes a
violation of the other as well. See, e.g., Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374 (citing Stewart, 149
Idaho at 389 nA). Thus, a violation of either the pleading theory orthe statutory theory
results in a violation of the Idaho constitution's protections against double jeopardy.
Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527,530-31.
22 Ms. Nelson did not report that Mr. Moffat had caused her other injuries stopped, and
then began to strangle her. (See generally, R., pp.5-16.) Rather, she only reported that
he had grabbed her about the hair and neck and threw her into various objects.
(R., p.6.) Her amended report only indicated that during this time, she felt unable to
breathe. (R., pp.14, 75.) Regardless, her version of the events was that the choking
occurred as part of the same course of conduct: "She did not know how long she'd
been choked, but remembers after being choked she was tossed to the ground. She
18

Therefore, this Court must conclude that although these two crimes
occurred at the same time, there are distinct facts and circumstances that
resulted in the commission of two separate crimes.
(R., p.97.)

The district court's analysis was directly contrary to established United

States Supreme Court precedent, and thus was clearly erroneous. Rather, there was
but one course of conduct which underlay both prosecutions and there was no
separation between the acts.

See Brown, 432 U.S. at 167-69. As such, under the

pleading theory, the second and independent prosecution for attempted strangulation
was constitutionally invalid. See id.; Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at
211-12.
Apart from focusing too narrowly for purposes of the pleading theory, the district
court's determination of the facts under that theory was clearly erroneous. (Compare
R., p.96 with R., pp.76-77.) The district court claimed that Mr. Moffat's assertion - that

he pled guilty based on his grabbing at the victim's neck23
Tolman's report and testimony.

(R., p.96.)

-

was disproved by Officer

In fact, Officer Tolman testified that the

indicated that while [Mr.] Moffat was choking her, he was pulling her hair with the other
hand. She stated that she was in a lot of pain during this incident." (R., pp.14, 75
(emphasis added).) As such, the record clearly indicates only one course of conduct,
and as such, there is no valid, constitutional basis for the second, independent
prosecution. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211-12; but see
McCormick, 100 Idaho 114-15 (a continuous stream of events constitutes two separate
offenses when the course of events required for one dissimilar offense (i.e., burglarybreaking and entering with intent to commit a theft or felony therein (see I.C. § 181401)) is completed before the course of events required for the other dissimilar offense
begins (i.e., rape - requires an act of intercourse (see I.C. § 18-1601), and the reason
such a result is acceptable is that there is bilateral uniqueness between the governing
statutes).
23 If true, this would unambiguously demonstrate that the two charges were for the same
offense. (See, e.g., R., pp.96-97.) It is not necessary to prove that, however. The fact
that there was not a separate course of conduct and that one charge (attempted
strangulation) was but the means or method by which the other (domestic battery) was
committed is sufficient to demonstrate that the two charges were for one offense. See
Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435.
19

report he forwarded to the county prosecutor was only in relation to a potential
aggravated assault charge from a different date, not Mr. Moffat's conduct on May 9,
2010:
A [Officer Tolman]. She had scrape marks on her nose. I believe she had
scrape marks on her back, and she did have some finger-type marks on
her neck that I could distinguish.
Q [by prosecutor]. And when you went about completing the investigation,
you issued a citation?

A. I did, for Domestic Battery ....
Q. You said that you had not determined that there had been any felony
committed?

A. At that time, no. I didn't see any felony.

But at a later time date in time, did you make a determination there
had been a possible felony?
Q.

A. I did. The following day after [Ms. Nelson] had gone to court, she
came back in and was upset that we hadn't mentioned anything about the
report of Mr. Moffat holding a gun to her head, and I went back and
reviewed the notes that Sergeant Higby and I had taken and a taperecorded interview that we had conducted and found that I had missed
that when she said it. She said it very briefly,24 and it kind of came back to
-- she came back to ask why we didn't bring it up, so we brought her back
in and did an interview again, tape-recorded, and she gave us a little more
information ... and then we forwarded that to the Prosecuting Attorney to
make the determination on felony charges.
Q. And you said "felony charges" was just ag [sic] assault that she-

24 The summary of those notes included in the report forwarded to the prosecutor
indicate that the event with the gun was a significant point of conversation during that
interview. (R., p.15.) As such, the officer's testimony that Ms. Nelson "said it very
briefly" (implying that her focus was on other facts, which the district court determined,
without any other indication in the record to that effect, to be Mr. Moffat's conduct on
May 9, 2010) is either a gross misremembrance or a deliberate misrepresentation of the
facts. Either way, in light of the clear evidence in the reports included in the record
(see, e.g., R., pp.6-16. 75-77), the district court could not have reasonably relied on that
testimony to undermine Mr. Moffat's representations about the procedural history of his
case.
20

A. We were just looking for Aggravated Assault at that point; that's all we

had."
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.24, L.22 - p.27, L.23.)

The fact that Officer Tolman testified that he

forwarded his report in order to get a determination on a potential aggravated assault
because "that's all we had" on May 10, 2010, also indicates that he believed the charge
of domestic battery adequately dealt with Mr. Moffat's course of conduct on May 9,
2010. (See Tr., p.27, Ls.1-23.) As the record demonstrates, the district court relied on

the officer's statements in regard to an entirely separate investigation to attempt to
create a distinction between parts of Mr. Moffat's conduct on May 9, 2010.

(See

R., p.96.) Officer Tolman's testimony did not contradict anything asserted by Mr. Moffat
in regard to his conduct on May 9,2010, (see Tr., Vol. 1, p.24, L.22 - p.27, L.23) and, as
such, the district court's finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous.
Worse, the district court decided that what Officer Tolman had meant to say was
that there were other injuries involved, which were the basis for the initial citation and
that it was only after a follow-up interview, in which the victim confronted him regarding
potential attempted strangulation charges, that he referred the issue pertaining to
attempted strangulation to the prosecutors. 25 (R., p.96.) Such reading of the facts is

As all these injuries were part of the event which occurred on May 9, 2010, the subtle
distinction between which particular act underlay each charge is inappropriate.
Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211-12. Rather, the focus is properly
on the course of conduct as a whole, and what the charges filed were. Id. Therefore,
as both charging documents were for Mr. Moffat's actions on May 9, 2010, (particularly,
the citation for the misdemeanor domestic battery, which covered all the injuries
Ms. Nelson suffered (see R., pp.71-73), there was only one course of conduct, and
thus, no independent basis for the second prosecution. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at
435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211-12 (even though the individual actions required to prove
robbery and felony murder are different (taking of property by force, as opposed to
causing the death of another human being) independent conviction for robbery could
not stand because it was the means or method by which the felony murder was
committed); but see Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 757 (the only way for actions within the same
course of conduct to be separate offenses is to have bilateral uniqueness).
25

21

also clearly erroneous. Officer Tolman's summarized for which injuries (and thus, for
which actions) the domestic battery charge had been issued: "She had scrape marks
on her nose. I believe she had a scrape mark on her back, and she did have some

finger-type marks on her neck that I could distinguish.,,26
(emphasis added).)

(Tr., p.24, L.20 - p.25, L.2

Because he included the marks to Ms. Nelson's neck within the

injuries covered by the domestic battery charge, Officer Tolman had to necessarily
include the grasping of the throat as part of the course of conduct underlying the
domestic battery charge.

As a result, the charging document (the officer's citation)

covered Mr. Moffat's course of conduct, which included the grasping of Ms. Nelson's
throat. Thus, the charging document for the attempted strangulation triggered a second
prosecution and ultimately a second punishment for that same course of conduct. (See
R., pp.1, 36.) That second prosecution and second punishment for that same charged
offense violated Mr. Moffat's state constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.

See e.g., Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211-12.
Had the State wanted to pursue both counts, it could have sought a single
indictment charging each crime as a separate count. 27 Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530-31.

26 In his report, Officer Tolman had described these marks as "injuries to the left side of
her neck. She had several red scrape marks consistent with finger marks." (R., p.5.)
He also stated that they were "distinct red marks on her neck which still appeared to be
fresh and had fresh scraped skin." (R., p.6.) These descriptions indicate that they were
actual injuries which Officer Tolman had included as part of his charge for domestic
battery.
27 Cities and counties are not separate sovereigns, but are rather subordinate entities
within the sovereignty of the State. '''Political subdivisions of States-counties, cities, or
whatever-never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather,
they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities
created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions.'"
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392 (1970) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
575 (1964»; Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 468-69 (recognizing the Waller holding as
controlling law). Therefore, the fact that the two prosecutions were carried out by
different prosecuting bodies (the City of Pocatello and Bannock County) does not
22

Proceeding in a separate prosecution for the second allegation based on the
same course of conduct, however, violates the protections against double jeopardy.
See, e.g., Blo ckb urger, 284 U.S. at 304; Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530-31; Stewart, 149

Idaho at 392. In this case, therefore, where there are two separate prosecutions and
two separate punishments for the same offense, the second prosecution and second
punishment violated Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional rights to be free from
double jeopardy, and thus the second conviction cannot stand. See Flegel, 151 Idaho
at 530-31; Stewart, 149 Idaho at 392.

Therefore, the district court's denial of

Mr. Moffat's motion to dismiss was improper and should be overturned. The result is
that his conviction for attempted strangulation should be vacated.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Moffat respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his conviction.
DATED this 24th day of May, 2012.

L-/~
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

prevent the dual prosecutions from violating Mr. Moffat's state and federal constitutional
protections against double jeopardy. See id. And, as such, the State did have the
power to combine the two prosecutions if it wanted to pursue both charges.
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